Network security protocols depend mainly on developing cryptographic schemes and using biometric methods. These have led to several security protocols that are unbreakable based on difficulty of solving untractable mathematical problems such as factoring large integers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Traffic Engineering (ITE) aim to provide fast, reliable, quality of demands, and differentiated services for end users. Such services can be deployed at the IP, physical, and application layers. Several security schemes and network protection strategies have been proposed during the last two decades to protect operational networks against link failures, node attacks, increased overhead and congestion. The goal in this paper is to provide novel strategies for network security services against attacks and eavesdroppers by deploying network coding and shared capacity. The strategies can be deployed to protect network traffic between core nodes such as routers or switches.
Protection of communication networks against network attacks and failures is essential to increase robustness, reliability, and availability of the transmitted data. The attacks may also occur at various network layers, including the physical, IP, or application layers [13] , [16] - [18] . Also, network attacks can occur due to vulnerable network configurations or due to insecure data transmission. These problems have received significant attention from researchers and practitioners, and a large number of techniques have been introduced to address such problems. On the other side, traditional network security schemes depend mainly on developing cryptographic protocols or on using biometric methods. Essentially, cryptographic protocols are considered unbreakable based on difficulty of solving mathematical problems such as factoring large integers [17] , [18] .
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently Fig. 1 . n links are shared between sets of senders and receivers. One link is used for data integrity and message authentication in case of a single link attack. The trusted party can be a router (or switch) to share messages between senders or receivers.
used to increase the throughput, capacity, and performance of communication networks. Information theoritic aspects of network coding have been investigated in [1] , [7] , [8] and [20] . Network coding certainly can offer benefits in terms of energy efficiency, additional security, and delay minimization. For example, network coding is used to detect adversaries [10] and to protect packets against network attackers and injectors [5] , [9] , [12] . Network coding can also be used to enhance security and protection [2] , [12] , [14] . In this paper, we propose an approach for light-weight network security that is based on network coding. We develop a scheme called SNEED, Securing Networks by Employing Encoding and Decoding, in order to protect transmitted data between sets of senders and receivers. For one path between a sender and receiver that has been attacked (eavesdropped), one backup path is provided, in which it will carry encoded data from sources to receivers. The scheme is also generalized to provide protection against multiple attacked paths.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we describe the network model and basic assumptions. The node can be a router, switch, or an end terminal depending on the network model and transmission layer.
978-1-61284-233-2/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE A. Network Model i) Let N be a network represented by an abstract graph G = (V, E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of undirected edges. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . .} and R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . .} be sets of independent sources and destinations, respectively. The set V = V ∪S ∪R contains the relay nodes, sources, and destinations as shown in Fig. 1 . Assume for simplicity that |S| = |R| = n, and hence the number of sources is equal to the number of receivers. Assume also that the senders (receivers) are connected by a super sender (receiver), which acts as a trusted party. ii) A connection path L i is a set of edges connected together with a starting node (sender) and an ending node (receiver). The paths L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . .} carry data from the sources to the receivers. Connection paths are link disjoint and provisioned in the network between senders and receivers. All connections have the same bandwidth, or otherwise a connection with a high bandwidth can be divided into multiple connections, each of which has the unit capacity. iii) Every sender s i will send a message m i to receiver r i at time t δ in round in cycle δ, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A receiver r i receiving a message m i is able to detect whether the message has been altered by using any authentication or signaling protocols. Further details regarding this model, definition of the working and backup paths, and the normalized capacity can be found in [2] and [3] . iv) Enc k and Dec k represent the encryption and decryption algorithms with a shared symmetric key k, respectively.
B. Senders and Receivers Packets
Every sender s i prepares a packet packet si→ri to be sent to receiver r i . The packet contains the sender's ID si , data m i , and time for every round and cycle t δ . There are four types of packets that carry the data: i) Plain Packets. Packets sent without network coding or encryption, in which the sender does not require to perform any coding or encrypting operations. For example, in case of packets sent without coding, the sender s i sends the following packet to receiver r i :
ii) Encoded Packets. Packets sent with encoded data without encryption, in which the sender requires to perform other senders' data. For example, in case of packets sent with encoded data, sender s i sends the following packet to receiver r i :
where S is the set of sources sending plain messages. iii) Encrypted Packets. Assume there is a shared symmetric key between a sender s i and receiver r i . In this case, sender s i will send the packet packet si→ri as follows:
This packet carries an encrypted message without encoding. iv) Encoded and Encrypted Packets. Packets sent with encoded data with encryption, in which the sender needs to protect other senders' data. For example, in case of packets sent with encoded encrypted data, the sender s i sends the following packet to receiver r i :
The value
is computed by every sender s i , in which it is able to collect the data from all other senders and encode them by using the XORed operations.
C. Attackers Model
We represent an attacker model as follows. There are two types of attacks in which the network security services must overcome: Active (intruders) and passive (eavesdroppers) attackers [19] . We also assume that t different attackers have access to t channels among all n channels L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L n at a certain round time, for t ≥ 1. This is similar to an attacker accessing t channels. Multiple attackers which attack the same channel are represented by one attacker.
i) The passive attacker is able to eavesdrop on the transmission between the senders and receivers. A passive attacker such as an eavesdropper should be able to extract any information even if it has a copy of it. ii) The active attacker can modify or fabricate messages throughout a cycle. This occurs by injecting new data (coefficients) at the relay nodes of data sent by the sources. This can occur also over the shared links. In addition, an active attacker will be able to change or fabricate information, and affect the system resources. This attacker model is similar to the attacker model described for wiretapping channels as stated by many authors [6] , [20] .
III. DATA SECURITY AGAINST A SINGLE ATTACKED PATH BY USING SHARED KEYS AND NETWORK CODING
In this section, we consider the case of a single active attacker, i.e., t = 1. We will assume that there are shared symmetric keys between the senders and receivers. Also, the receivers are able to detect messages that have been modified by the attackers using hashing functions like MD5 or SHA-1; fabricated messages can be detected by using sequence numbers between the senders and receivers [17] , [18] .
Let k i be a shared symmetric key between s i and r i . This key can be distributed by using a Trusted Third Parity (TTP). In this case, the senders exist in a secure domain and so do 
the receivers. Let x i be the encrypted message from sender s i to receiver r i by using the shared key k i . Thus,
A. Encoding Operations: The encoding operations are done as follows. At every round time, n − 1 senders will send their own data with full capacity over n−1 paths that are established from the sources to the destinations. Also, these n − 1 sources will exchange their data with exactly one source node s i that will send the Xored encoded data over a shared link L i . This process is explained in Eq. (6) in Table 1 ; we call it SNEED against a single attacked path (SAP). The data is sent in rounds for every cycle. Also, we assume that the attacker can affect only one path throughout a cycle, but different paths might suffer from different active attackers throughout different cycles. In this case, throughout of one cycle consists of n rounds, y j 's for 1 ≤ j ≤ n is defined over F 2 as
The senders send packets to the set of receivers in rounds. Every packet initiated from the sender s i contains ID si , data x s i , and a round t δ . For example, the sender s i will send the encrypted packet si−→ri as follows.
Also, the sender s j will send the encoded encrypted data y sj as packet sj −→−→rj = (ID sj , y sj , t δ ).
We ensure that the encoded data y sj is varied per one round transmission for every cycle. This means that the path L j is dedicated to send only one encoded data y j and all data x 1 j , x 2 j , . . . , x n−1 j . The data transmitted from the sources do not experience any round time delay. This means that the receivers will be able to decrypt the received packets online and immediately recover the attacked data. In Eq. (6), the active attacker can break only one message per one attacked working path. A generalization of this scheme is presented in Section V where the active attacker(s) has access to t multiple channels simultaneously.
Lemma 1: The normalized network capacity according to Eq. (6) is (n − 1)/n.
Proof: The proof comes from the fact that only one encoded packet is sent over one channel throughout every round per cycle. Therefore, there are (n − 1) plain packets sent over n channels.
B. Decoding and Data Integrity Operations:
The decoding operations are done as follows. Every receiver r i will receive a message x i over the link L i . Once the attack occurs at a link L i , then the receiver that receives y over the path L will be used for data integrity and recovery.
In case the attacker modifies the message, the receiver r i will know about the modified message by using the MD5 hashing function, and so r i will ask other receivers to send their messages to recover the modified message.
Receiver r i will decrypt the message x i by using its symmetric key k i , i.e., m i = dec ki (x i ).
IV. SNEED WITHOUT SHARING SYMMETRIC KEYS
In this section, we propose to use network coding to secure the traffic between the senders and receivers against active attackers, where no symmetric keys are shared. Consider a network with n connections shared between n senders and receivers. We will assume that every sender will be able to combine packets from other receivers to hide its own data. For example, sender s i will send the encoded message y i to receiver r i over link L i .
We will design a security scheme by using network coding against an entity which can not only copy or listen to the message, but also can fabricate new messages or modify the current ones. In this model, we do not assume pre-shared secret keys between the senders and receivers. Also, the message is still secured against attack's fabrication and modification.
A. Network Security Codes and SNEED
We will define network security codes for SNEED and study their properties. We assume there is a super sender S that sends n different messages over disjoint paths to n receivers as shown in Fig. 2 . Furthermore, the receivers can communicate with each other by using a trusted party. The goal is to provide collaborative security for the n messages against eavesdroppers, intruders, and malicious attackers. We will develop SNEED over the binary field, and hence the fastest encoding and decoding operations are used.
One useful application of SNEED is to transmit multimedia and TV streams over a public network as in the Internet. Such streams must be processed online with fast encoding and decoding operations, in addition to the security operations. Let Fig. 2 . n shared links between a set of senders and a set of receivers.
One link is used for data integrity and authentication. A path is a set of links connecting a set of nodes (routers or switches). An algorithm to solve a commodity problem can be used to provision a set of n link disjoint paths between two core nodes for a given network topology.
d be the minimum distance defined as in the notion of error correcting codes [11] , [15] . Definition 2 (SNEED): An [n, k, d] 2 network security code is a k-dimensional subspace of the space F n 2 that secures k information symbols (messages) by mapping them into n mixed symbols, and can recover from upto d−1 compromised (attacked) channels. Furthermore, the code is generated by a nonsystematic matrix G of size k × n defined over F 2 .
We will use the nonsystematic classical binary error correcting codes in the construction of SNEED [11] , [15] . The encoding scheme of such codes is given by
The encoding message y j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n , is defined by
Lemma 3: The normalized capacity of the network utilizing SNEED is given by k/n.
Proof: By the definition of the network security code, there are n − k redundant symbols that are used to recover from up to d − 1 attached channels. Therefore, there are k working paths that will carry k source data. The result is a consequence by dividing the total number of working paths by the total number of channels. Table II presents the best known SNEED for certain number of channels defined over F 2 .
We have n−k lockers' channels, in which they carry redundant data, in this model. From the proposed code construction, we ensure that t = d − 1 ≤ n − k, where t is the number of compromised (attacked) channels. This is actually a direct consequence of the Singleton bound [4] , [11] , [15] .
B. Decoding Operations of SNEED
The decoding operations at the receivers side are guaranteed once a system of t linearly independent equations is established in t unknown variables. Let t attackers can access t disjoint channels and alter the transmitted messages. We assumed that the receivers are located in a trusted domain, therefore they can trust and exchange protected messages with each others.
The system can be solved by using, for example, Gauss elimination method. By definition of SNEED, the matrix G has dimension of k. Furthermore, the receivers will know the number and position of the channels that have been attacked. In this case, the decoding operations are achieved by using the well known decoding methods for erasure channels, see [11] .
The following example illustrates the proposed model. Example 4: Assume we have a connection L i between a sender s i and a receiver r i for i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Furthermore, the channel L 4 is used as a lock (redundant) path. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the four senders send
We also assume that the attacker affects only one of channels L 1 , L 2 or L 3 . In this example, SNEED can be stated as follows. There are three working paths and one lock path.
The security scheme is given by
If the channel L 2 is compromised, then the decoding can be done by using Gauss elimination method over the channels L 1 , L 3 and L 4 . Adding y 1 , y 3 and y 4 will give m 1 , and then substituting in y 1 and y 3 will give m 2 and m 3 .
V. SNEED OVER HIGHER FINITE FIELDS
In this section, we study security of networks employing encoding and decoding, SNEED, against multiple link attacks. We propose SNEED over a finite field with q elements to achieved this goal. This scheme is an extension of the scheme presented in Section III, where the encoding and decoding operations are defined over the binary field. Assume t be the number of compromised channels. One can design a matrix G over F q such that k = n − t paths will carry secure data. Let a be a primitive element in F q . The matrix G is defined by 
The matrix G has rank of k = n − t. Clearly, a finite field with q > n − t + 1 is sufficient for the encoding and decoding operations. The encoding operations are done by using the following encoding scheme. 
By this construction, if there are up to t attacked paths, then the system of (n − t) × (n − t) equations is solvable. This is due to the fact that the remaining matrix can be reduced to the Vandermond matrix [11, Chapter 4] . We will elaborate more details about the encoding and decoding operations of this scheme in our future work.
